Russia’s Berserk Bear Actively Attacking The Energy Sector Russian adversaries, known as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, TEMP.Isotope, TeamSpy, ...
Jorge Orchilles
6 min. read
20 Nov 2020
Russia’s Berserk Bear Actively Attacking The Energy Sector
Russian adversaries, known as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, TEMP.Isotope, TeamSpy, Dragonfly 2.0, Havex, Crouching Yeti, IRON LIBERTY, TG-4192, Castle, Dymallos, and Koala, that have been active since at least 2005, are playing 'Chekhov's Gun' with US infrastructure according to one of my favorite journalists, Andy Greenberg of WIRED. We have many customers in the energy sector and thought this would be an ideal threat actor to understand and emulate given the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) advisory on October 22, 2020. As usual for #ThreatThursday, we will understand Berserk Bear’s behavior, map to MITRE ATT&CK and share the ATT&CK Navigator JSON, create and share an adversary emulation plan in the largest, public adversary behavior repository, and discuss how to defend against this energy sector adversary. We hope you enjoy!
Berserk Bear: Cyber Threat Intelligence
On October 22, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert AA20-296A about Russian state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actor activity targeting various U.S. state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) government networks, as well as aviation networks. It stated that since at least September 2020, a Russian state-sponsored APT actor—known variously as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, TeamSpy, Dragonfly, Havex, Crouching Yeti, and Koala in open-source reporting—has conducted a campaign against a wide variety of U.S. targets.
Given SCYTHE has many energy sector customers, we think this would be a great example of an adversary to analyze, consume Cyber Threat Intelligence, map to MITRE ATT&CK, and create an adversary emulation plan.
These are the first sources we consumed upon hearing about Berserk Bear:
According to Sean Lyngass, Berserk Bear is less conspicuous. They have used “waterholing,” or infecting websites and then picking off high-value login credentials, to compromise the IT networks of critical infrastructure companies in Europe and North America. The FBI and CSIS alert focused focuses on how Berserk Bear gains initial access with very well known vulnerabilities:
While the focus so far has been on Berserk Bear obtaining user and administrator credentials to establish initial access. This is to enable lateral movement once inside the network and locate high value assets in order to exfiltrate data. However, the FBI and CISA have no information to indicate this APT actor has intentionally disrupted any aviation, education, elections, or government operations. However, the actor may be seeking access to obtain future disruption options, to influence U.S. policies and actions, or to delegitimize SLTT government entities.
From Andy Greenberg’s article "What makes them unique is the fact that they have been so focused on infrastructure throughout their existence, whether it's mining, oil, and natural gas in different countries or the grid," says Vikram Thakur, a researcher at security firm Symantec who has tracked the group over several distinct hacking campaigns since 2013.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Given the various threat actor names given to this adversary, there are multiple sources already mapped to MITRE ATT&CK:
After consuming the Cyber Threat Intelligence reports and mapping to MITRE ATT&CK, we organized the TTPs by Tactic and created a threat profile for Berserk Bear:
Tactic
Description
Objective
Hold access to critical infrastructure for later use. However, we have yet to see them pull the trigger.
T1560 - Archive Collected Data T1074.001 - Local Data Staging T1005 - Data from Local System T1114.002 - Remote Email Collection T1056.001 - Keylogging T1113 - Screen Capture
Execution
T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 - PowerShell T1059.003 - Windows Command Shell T1059.006 - Python T1053.005 - Scheduled Task T1204.001 - Malicious Link T1204.002 - Malicious File
Defense Evasion
T1562.004 - Disable or Modify System Firewall T1070.001 - Clear Windows Event Logs T1070.004 - File Deletion T1036 - Masquerading T1112 - Modify Registry T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information T1027.002 - Software Packing T1055 - Process Injection T1055.003 - Thread Execution Hijacking T1221 - Template Injection T1078 - Valid Accounts T1497.001 - System Checks
T1098 - Account Manipulation T1547.001 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.009 - Shortcut Modification T1136.001 - Local Account T1133 - External Remote Services T1505.003 - Web Shell
Discovery
T1012 - Query Registry T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery T1033 - System Owner/User Discovery T1049 - System Network Connections Discovery T1057 - Process Discovery T1082 - System Information Discovery T1083 - File and Directory Discovery T1135 - Network Share Discovery
Defend against Berserk Bear
The FBI and CSIS recommendations focus on a number of areas that our users most likely already know such as keep all applications updated according to vendor recommendations, and especially prioritize updates for external facing applications and remote access services to address CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2020-0688, CVE 2019-10149, CVE-2018-13379, and CVE-2020-1472. However they do dive a little deeper into other areas to avoid initial access:
Follow Microsoft’s guidance on monitoring logs for activity related to the Netlogon vulnerability, CVE-2020-1472.
Prevent external communication of all versions of SMB and related protocols at the network boundary by blocking Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) ports 139 and 445 and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port 137. See the CISA publication on SMB Security Best Practices for more information.
Isolate external facing services in a network demilitarized zone (DMZ) since they are more exposed to malicious activity; enable robust logging, and monitor the logs for signs of compromise.
Establish a training mechanism to inform end users on proper email and web usage, highlighting current information and analysis and including common indicators of phishing. End users should have clear instructions on how to report unusual or suspicious emails.
Implement application controls to only allow execution from specified application directories. System administrators may implement this through Microsoft Software Restriction Policy, AppLocker, or similar software. Safe defaults allow applications to run from PROGRAMFILES, PROGRAMFILES(X86), and WINDOWS folders. All other locations should be disallowed unless an exception is granted.
Block Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections originating from untrusted external addresses unless an exception exists; routinely review exceptions on a regular basis for validity.
Conclusion
While Berserk Bear has yet to be seen doing something destructive, defenders can still leverage cyber threat intelligence to implement detections against its behaviors. As always, we ingested the Cyber Threat Intelligence, mapped it to MITRE ATT&CK, and created an adversary emulation plan based off of the threat’s behaviors. As more research is done on this threat, we’ll be able to further emulate its behaviors and look for key unique techniques it does. We hope you enjoyed this week’s Threat Thursday and we are extending a big thanks to the awesome team at Cyborg Security who provided their video on their side of detections!
#ThreatThursday Library
Learn more about SCYTHE’s weekly Threat Thursday research reports by going to the #ThreatThursday page in our Unicorn Library, watching the videos on SCYTHE’s YouTube Channel, or follow #ThreatThursday and our CTO, Jorge Orchilles (@jorgeorchilles) on Twitter.
This Threat Thursday post discusses active research by SCYTHE and other cited third parties into an ongoing threat. The information in this post should be considered preliminary and may be updated as research continues. This information is provided “as-is” without any warranty or condition of any kind, either express or implied.
About SCYTHE
SCYTHE provides an advanced attack emulation platform for the enterprise and cybersecurity consulting market. The SCYTHE platform enables Red, Blue, and Purple teams to build and emulate real-world adversarial campaigns in a matter of minutes. Customers are in turn enabled to validate the risk posture and exposure of their business and employees and the performance of enterprise security teams and existing security solutions. Based in Arlington, VA, the company is privately held and is funded by Gula Tech Adventures, Paladin Capital, Evolution Equity, and private industry investors. For more information email info@scythe.io, visit https://scythe.io, or follow on Twitter @scythe_io.
About Cyborg Security
Cyborg Security is a threat hunting pioneer. Reimagining threat hunting in a first-of-its-kind platform, Cyborg Security's HUNTER platform provides tailored threat hunt and detection packages, and a threat feed focused on operationalized threat data, to augment analysts into hunters and evolve traditional security operations into skilled hunt teams. To learn more, visit cyborgsecurity.com, or follow us on Twitter and LinkedIn.